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The Devil Made Me Do It:  The Corporate Purchase of Insurance 
 
Victor P. Goldberg 
 
For decades I have argued against invoking risk aversion when analyzing the behavior of 
large, sophisticated firms. (Goldberg (1980 and 1990))  One response to my position has 
been: how, then, can you explain the widespread purchase of insurance?  That question 
can be turned on its head: since public corporations ought to be risk neutral, and since 
they do buy lots of insurance, the reason must be something other than risk aversion.1  To 
this, hard-core aversionistas have conceded that the corporation might be risk neutral, but 
the decision-makers, those pesky managers, are risk averse.2  That hypothesis could 
salvage the risk aversion assumption and allow analysts to ignore other reasons for 
corporate insurance purchases.  I want to suggest one fact that would be hard to square 
with the risk-averse manager hypothesis.  Counterparties insist upon it.  That is, the 
decision to maintain the insurance does not necessarily reside with the firm (or its 
managers) itself; it is often a condition imposed on the firm by a contractual counterparty.   
 
Hard, but not impossible.  Managers and counterparties might both prefer policies that 
reduce the variance of the firm’s cash flows; they could agree on an insurance clause that 
would benefit both at the expense of the shareholders’ interests.   If the interests of the 
two coincide, however, then there would be no reason for the counterparty to require the 
insurance—the managers would purchase it anyway.  If shareholders were gullible, 
managers might rationalize their insurance purchase to their shareholders by claiming 
that it was foisted on them by the counterparty.   If we are not prepared to invoke 
gullibility, then the question is: in what circumstances would the counterparty require 
insurance when the firm (and its managers) would prefer not to insure?   
 
To be sure, one cannot rule out the possibility that at least some insurance purchases are 
motivated by managerial risk preferences.  My point is that if we want to explain why 
firms purchase insurance, risk attitudes would not be the most fruitful place to look.  
Instead, the focus should be on why insurance (or, more precisely, the package of 
services provided by insurance companies) might create value, regardless of the risk 
preferences of managers, shareholders, or other corporate stakeholders. 
 
There are a number of reasons why the purchase of insurance might create value for a 
firm, and these are independent of the counterparty’s (typically a buyer, landlord, or 
lender) concerns.  In Part 1, I review these reasons.  The counterparty requirement is a 
fairly widespread practice, and Part 2 provides illustrations.  In Part 3, I propose an 
explanation for the requirement.  In the final section, I relate this to a methodological 
matter: the role of risk preferences in general, and risk aversion in particular, in analyzing 
transactions involving sophisticated business firms. To anticipate, that role should be the 
explanation-of-last-resort. 
1.  Why Insure? 
                                                 
1As Mayers and Smith  (1982, p. 282) noted, “the purchase of insurance by firms at actuarially unfair rates 
would represent a negative net present value project, reducing stockholder wealth.” 
2 Cite. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1338336
 3 
 
Insurance would seem to have two negative effects on the corporate purchaser.  First, 
since the insurer must be paid, the insurance product is actuarially unfair; the expected 
return to insurance purchasers would be negative.  Second, since insurance weakens the 
incentives of the insureds to take care (that is, there is moral hazard) the expected 
magnitude of the damages, (and the price of the insurance) would increase, making the 
insurance an even worse bargain.  And yet they buy.   
 
Rather than being value reducing, the insurance can be value enhancing.  Insurers provide 
more than pure insurance; they provide risk management services, the most obvious 
being inspection and loss reduction.3  In some lines the amount of resources going 
towards inspection and prevention is substantial.  For example, more than twenty percent 
of the premium dollar for steam boiler insurance goes toward inspection. Indeed, the 
Hartford Steam Boiler Insurance and Inspection Company began as an inspection 
company.  (Goldberg (1980)) If an accident were to occur after an inspection there would 
be a causation question: did the accident occur despite the fact that the inspector did a 
workmanlike job?  One way of avoiding that question is to share responsibility for the 
damages by using the same tools insurers do—deductibles, co-payments, and liability 
limitations.4  
 
Firms are willing to pay for services that decrease the likelihood of accidents and the 
financial consequences if an accident were to occur.  Whether the services are provided 
internally or by purchase from outsiders, is a standard make-versus-buy question.  For 
many, the specialized outsider will be the most cost effective provider, and that provider 
will be an insurance company.  The insurance company need not even be the direct 
provider; it might play the role of the general contractor, putting together the risk 
management services more effectively than the corporation could on its own.  Thus, even 
though insurance does create the potential for moral hazard and, therefore, the increased 
incidence and costs of accidents, the purchase of risk management services from an 
insurer could have the opposite effect, reducing the net costs of accidents. 
 
For a vivid example of the insurer’s role, consider the role of the “cast insurer” in the 
making of a movie. Because Nicole Kidman’s knee problem had resulted in claims on a 
prior film,  
 
Kidman's acting career was in limbo.  When she was proposed as the star 
of Miramax's Cold Mountain, Lloyd's of London effectively turned her 
down by asking a 20 percent premium, which no movie could afford. . . . 
She agreed to wear a support bandage on her knee during the 
preproduction and filming of Cold Mountain . . . . For their part, the 
                                                 
3 Others have recognized the role of the insurer as service provider; see, for example Mayers and Smith 
(1982) and Doherty and Smith (1993). 
4 I do not mean to suggest that all corporate insurance provides inspection services; indeed, steam boiler 
insurance is an outlier, the share of the premium dollar going toward inspection being much lower for most 
lines of insurance. 
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producers agreed to substitute a double for any activity, even bending 
down, that might stress her knee. . . .  
 
Insurers may require periodic medical examinations during shooting, 
including testing for illegal drugs, or even continuous medical treatment 
for some actors. (Kidman, for example, was required to take daily doses of 
medicine for her thyroid gland.) They also place stringent restrictions on 
what actors can do off the set--no motorcycles, surfing, or flying planes. 
As for what happens on set, the insurer analyzes every shot in the script 
for potential risks. Once the production starts, they also station hawk-eyed 
agents, called loss-control reps, on location to make sure that the stars are 
not put in harm's way. If a shot presents the slightest danger of causing an 
injury that might delay shooting, the reps bar actors from participating in 
them. Either a stunt person substitutes for the actor or the shot is changed 
to eliminate the danger. (Epstein (2005). 
 
Insurers have other ways besides inspection for altering risks.  Simply by offering 
discounts to firms that choose to install certain equipment, the insurer can reduce the 
accident costs.  The decision on the cost effectiveness of the equipment would be 
decentralized with the client determining whether the cost of the equipment is justified by 
the premium reduction.  Moreover, the insurer’s risk management is not confined to the 
pre-accident period.  If an accident were to occur, the insurer’s incentive would be to 
contain the post-accident losses (for example, legal services, claims processing and 
rehabilitation).  Again, if an insurer could do this more effectively than the corporation or 
other third party providers, the rational firm would purchase the service from the insurer.  
The insurance package can be unbundled so that the clients might, for example, provide 
their own inspection services and legal defense, but purchase claims management and 
rehabilitation services from insurers. 
 
Even if the insurer provided none of the services alluded to above, it could still add value 
in other ways.  Incentivizing managers and evaluating their performance is hampered in a 
noisy environment.  Distinguishing bad performance from bad luck can be difficult.  If 
the insurance were to make management’s performance more transparent by isolating 
matters beyond the manager’s control, a more effective incentive structure could enhance 
value. (Gilson & Whitehead (2008)) 
 
Insurance can be viewed as an element in the corporation’s capital structure.  Absent 
insurance, the occurrence of an otherwise insurable event could significantly alter the 
firm’s leverage; indeed, it could push the firm into bankruptcy.  By insuring, the firm 
could reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy and the costs that would entail.5  Short of 
bankruptcy, as the firm approaches the “zone of insolvency” the interests of shareholders 
and bondholders diverge.  On the one hand, the firm has an incentive to take on risky 
negative net present value projects since shareholders get the upside and debt the 
downside.  (See footnote 55 of Credit Lyonnais )  On the other, if the cost of capital were 
to rise because of the adverse event, the firm might fail to undertake positive present 
                                                 
5 Cite on the costs of bankruptcy. 
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value projects.  (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein.(1994)  Generally, liquidity is costly and 
insurance is one way of assuring it.  (Holmström and Tirole (2000)  A firm with liability 
insurance can carry a smaller inventory of cash or other relatively liquid assets.  In part, 
insurance is a substitute for a line of credit.  In fact, it is also a complement, since line of 
credit agreements routinely require that the borrower carry insurance.6   
 
It is, I think, unnecessary to go further to demonstrate that the package of services 
provided by insurance companies can add value regardless of the attitudes toward risk of 
any of the employees, managers, or owners of the client firm.7  The last example hints at 
where we shall go next: why does the bank extending the line of credit require the 
borrower to acquire (and maintain) insurance?  Regardless of whether a corporation 
wants to carry insurance for its own purposes, its counterparty in some (perhaps many) of 
its transactions will insist upon it. In the next section I provide some examples of this 
widespread practice.  In the following section I propose an explanation. 
 
2.  Counterparty Demands 
 
Sellers, tenants, and borrowers are often required to provide proof that they carry 
adequate insurance. Contract data bases (for example, onecle.com) have numerous 
examples of insurance clauses.  Let us first consider the restrictions imposed by buyers.  
A good place to start is General Motors’ standard purchasing agreement form, which 
included this insurance requirement:8 
 
17. INSURANCE: Seller shall maintain insurance coverage in amounts not less 
than the following: (a) Workers' Compensation - Statutory Limits for the state or 
                                                 
6 For example: 
 5.4 Insurance: Maintain insurance, at all times throughout the term of this Agreement, on 
its property with responsible insurance carriers having a rating by A.M. Bests of A or 
better acceptable to the Bank licensed to do business in the State of New York and in 
each jurisdiction in which the Company conducts business against such risks, loss, 
damage and liability (including liability to third parties) and in such amounts as is 
customarily maintained by similar businesses, including, without limitation, public 
liability and workers' compensation insurance, each such policy which shall name the 
Bank as additional insured and loss payee as its interests may appear and which shall 
require thirty (30) days prior notice to the Bank of cancellation or termination thereof and 
will file with the Bank within ten (10) days after request therefor a detailed list of such 
insurance then in effect, stating the names of the carriers thereof, the policy numbers, the 
insureds thereunder, the amounts of insurance, dates of expiration thereof and the 
property and risks covered thereby, together with a certificate of a duly authorized officer 
of the Company certifying that in the opinion of the management of the Company such 
insurance is adequate in nature and amount, complies with the obligations of the 
Company under this Section, and is in full force and effect. 
(Revolving Credit And Term Loan Agreement Between Netsmart Technologies and Fleet 
National Bank, June 1, 2001) 
. 
7 A number of authors note that insurance could provide tax advantages as well.  See Mayer and Smith 
(1982, 1990), Main (1983), and Chen and PonAral (1989).  Some insurance coverages are mandated by 
law. 
8 The form was used in the previous century; it does not reflect GM’s woes of 2008-9. 
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states in which this order is to be performed (or evidence of authority to 
self-insure); (b) Employer's Liability - $250,000; (c) Comprehensive General 
Liability (including Products/Completed Operations and Blanket Contractual 
Liability) - $1,000,000 per person, $1,000,000 per occurrence Personal Injury, 
and $1,000,000 per occurrence Property Damage, or $1,000,000 per occurrence 
Personal Injury and Property Damage combined single limit; and (d) Automobile 
Liability (including owned, non-owned and hired vehicles) - $1,000,000 per 
person, $1,000,000 per occurrence Personal Injury and $1,000,000 per occurrence 
Property Damage, or $1,000,000 per occurrence Personal Injury and Property 
Damage combined single limit. At Buyer's request, Seller shall furnish to Buyer 
certificates of insurance setting forth the amount(s) of coverage, policy 
number(s) and date(s) of expiration for insurance maintained by Seller and, if 
further requested by Buyer, such certificates will provide that Buyer shall 
receive thirty (30) days' prior written notification from the insurer of any 
termination or reduction in the amount of scope of coverages. Seller's purchase 
of appropriate insurance coverage or the furnishing of certificates of insurance 
shall not release Seller of its obligations or liabilities under this order. In 
the event of Seller's breach of this provision, Buyer shall have the right to 
cancel the undelivered portion of any goods or services covered by this order 
and shall not be required to make further payments except for conforming goods 
delivered or services rendered prior to cancellation.9 
 
There is no clear relationship between performance of a particular contract and the types 
of insurance that are to be maintained.  Failure to maintain automobile liability insurance 
would be grounds for termination, even if the seller would not use an automobile to 
perform the contract.  While the independence of the insurance coverage and the 
performance is common, in some instances a relationship exists. For example Boeing 
only required a supplier carry automobile insurance “if licensed vehicles will be used in 
connection with the performance of the work.”10   
 
Insurance companies vary in quality and some contracts take that into account.  General 
Motors’ seven-year, exclusive supply contract with American Axle & Manufacturing 
(AAM) had a loosely defined restriction of the supplier’s decision—it had to be 
“underwritten by insurance companies reasonably satisfactory to GM.”11  Some restraints 
were looser, requiring only “nationally recognized companies,”12 and some were tighter, 
specifying certain characteristics, for example “with a current A.M. Best's rating of A- 
with a financial size of no less than Class VIII.”13 
                                                 
9 Attachment to General Motors- American Axle & Manufacturing, Supply Agreement.  The agreement 
overrode this standard clause, imposing greater policy minimums and requiring the naming of GM as an 
“additional insured” for all but the automobile coverages. 
10 Boeing-Spirit Contract, clause 26.3.  Mercedes-Benz USA (MBUSA) had a more specific requirement in 
its agreement with ATX: “Professional Liability (Errors and Omissions, Multimedia Liability including 
Intellectual Property) Insurance on claims made or occurrence basis covering all services provided to 
MBUSA hereunder for $5,000,000 each occurrence.”  (Telematics Services Agreement, March 31, 2003).  
11 GM-AAM agreement, clause 10. 
12 Intel-Phoenix agreement, date, clause. 
13 John Deere-Stanadyne Agreement, date, clause. 
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While the insurance requirement is typically imposed only on the seller, in some 
instances the requirement is symmetrical: 
 
Each party to this Agreement will maintain insurance to protect itself  
from claims (i) by the party's employees, agents and subcontractors under 
Worker's Compensation and Disability Acts, (ii) for damages because of 
injury to or destruction of tangible property resulting out of any negligent 
act, omission or willful misconduct of the party or the party's employees 
or subcontractors, (iii) for damages because of bodily injury, sickness, 
disease or death of its employees or any other person arising out of any 
negligent act, omission, or willful misconduct of the party or the party's 
employees, agents or subcontractors.14 
 
Insurance requirements are common in commercial leases as well.  One function, not the 
primary focus here, is coordination of the coverage of landlord and tenant, allocating 
responsibility between them to avoid overlapping insurance or coverage gaps.  Some 
leases require that the tenant name the landlord (and sometimes the landlord’s lender as 
well) an “additional insured” for some policies,15 so those requirements would be an 
element of the landlord’s coverage.  But, in addition, the leases typically require that the 
tenants carry insurance on their own account.  For example, 
 
Tenant's Fire and Casualty Insurance. Tenant at its cost shall maintain on 
all of Tenant's merchandise, inventory, furniture, fixtures, equipment and 
improvements in, on, or about the Premises, a fire and other perils 
insurance policy (special form, open peril) to the extent of their full 
replacement value. The proceeds from this policy shall be used by Tenant 
for the replacement of the property and the restoration of Tenant's 
improvements or alterations.16 
 
Insurance requirements are common in commercial loans as well, the requirement in the 
line-of-credit agreement, noted above, providing one example. The American Bar 
Foundation Commentaries on the Model Debenture Indenture Provisions provides a 
number of sample insurance clauses. (American Bar Foundation (1971, pp. 341-348)) 
Herein, a simple example of such a clause:  
 
[The borrower will carry] insurance on all [its] respective properties in at 
least such amounts and against at least such risks (and with such risk 
                                                 
14 Manufacturing Agreement, Solectron California Corp. and Brocade Communications Systems Inc. July 
30, 1999. 
 
15“The insurance referred to in Paragraph 16(a)(ii) shall name Landlord as additional insured. In addition, the 
insurance referred to in Paragraph 16(a)(i), (ii), (iv) and (v) shall also name each Lender as an additional 
insured.”  (Lease between Anchor Court (Landlord) and Collins & Aikman (Tenant), June 29, 2001) 
 
16 Lease between Three Fifteen Bourbon Street, L.L.C. ("Landlord") and RCI Entertainment Louisiana, Inc. 
("Tenant"). February, 1996 
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retentions) as are usually insured against in the same general area by 
companies of established repute engaged in the same or a similar business; 
and will furnish to the Lenders, upon written request from the 
Administrative Agent, information presented in reasonable detail as to the 
insurance so carried. [The borrower] reasonably believes, at the time the 
relevant coverage is placed or renewed, [that the insurance companies] are 
financially sound and responsible. 17 
 
3.  Why insist? 
 
Why should a buyer, landlord, or lender care? (For expositional ease, I will hereafter 
refer to the buyer and supplier.)  It is reasonable to presume that they are not just busy-
bodies, gratuitously meddling in the affairs of others.  Nor is it reasonable to presume that 
supplier’s owners are systematically fooled by managers acting in cahoots with the 
buyers.18  Leaving aside the meshing of coverages--avoiding gaps and redundant 
coverage--how might requiring the supplier to carry certain insurance create value?   
 
For reasons stated above, the supplier has a strong motive to buy insurance, regardless of 
this particular contract.  Why then would the buyer impose an additional condition?   I 
can suggest two non-exclusive sets of explanations.  
 
One set depends on the insurer being a better judge of the supplier’s ability to perform in 
the future. The key concern is that over time circumstances can change. Suppose that at 
the formation stage the supplier carried the requisite insurance, but that the coverage was 
subsequently terminated.  What could the buyer reasonably infer from that?  First, if the 
insurance company canceled the policy because the supplier had failed to adopt policies 
that the insurer believed would adequately contain accident costs, and if such a failure put 
the supplier’s future ability to perform in doubt, the buyer could find the cancellation a 
valuable early warning.  In effect, the buyer free rides on the insurer’s monitoring effort.  
Second, even if the supplier wanted to continue to purchase insurance, its precarious 
fiscal situation could have altered its incentives.19  Protection from the risks covered by 
insurance would be of little value to the firm if its survival was at risk from basic market 
forces.  If the firm were in the zone of insolvency, it might plausibly choose to spend the 
insurance premia on investments that have a negative net present value, but, because of 
leverage, would have a positive expected value for the equity holders.  Put another way, 
the value of the limited guarantee provided by the insurer to the supplier decreases the 
greater the risk of failure from other causes.  And, conversely, that is when that guarantee 
would be more valuable to the buyer.20   
                                                 
17 $600,000,000 Bridge Loan Agreement Between Aramark Services and JPMorgan Chase Bank 
(November 30, 2001). 
18 The fact that insurance clauses are typically asymmetric with only sellers, tenants, and borrowers 
promising to maintain insurance, makes the fooling explanation even less plausible. 
19 Since some coverage (like workers’ compensation) is required by law, a failure to maintain it would send 
an ominous signal. 
20If the supplier’s solvency were not a serious concern, there would be less reason to rely on a third-party 
insurer. So, for example, DuPont could substitute self-insurance for third-party insurance.   “DuPont 
represents that it is sufficiently self-insured and will continue to remain self insured at or above for the 
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Obviously, it would not always be true that the insurer would be a better judge of 
viability than the buyer, but so long as it is sometimes true, the insurance mandate could 
provide value on this score. Even if that were not the case, it could still be of value to the 
buyer.  That brings us to the second set of explanations, which depends on the vagaries of 
litigation. In effect, the insurance mandate gives the buyer a rationale for terminating 
when it becomes concerned about the supplier’s ability to perform.  Suppose that the 
buyer had good reason to be concerned about the seller’s viability, but that proof might 
be difficult.  If however, it terminated the contract a court might find that reason 
unpersuasive and would find that the buyer was the breacher. The supplier (or the 
supplier’s trustee in bankruptcy) could argue that the termination was a breach of the 
contract. As Goetz and Scott (1983, p. 983) note, determining who breached has 
consequences: “there is only one breacher and he frequently loses the entire benefit of his 
bargain.”  To anticipate this problem, the buyer would include contractual devices that 
would increase the likelihood that if it terminated, a court would find the termination 
valid, and, ideally, it would prevail at summary judgment.  It might, for example, include 
an acceleration clause or “adequate assurance” clause.21   
 
Because the failure to maintain insurance is an easily verifiable fact, the insurance clause 
can also perform this function.  The legal process is not perfect.  One cannot be certain 
that any of these devices would succeed.  If the probability of success is not perfectly 
correlated, the contract might include a number of such devices, increasing the likelihood 
that at least one will protect the buyer. Some courts might allow the question of the 
buyer’s material breach of the insurance clause to get past summary judgment.  They 
might hold, for example, that the buyer had waived the right or that the breach was only 
partial, not total.  My point is only that the supplier’s failure to maintain insurance would 
increase the buyer’s confidence that it could terminate, have the supplier identified as the 
breacher, and obtain summary judgment.   
 
One virtue of the insurance clause is that is cheap.  The supplier would, in general, want 
to maintain insurance coverage.  It only gives up the flexibility to drop the insurance 
coverage when things are going poorly.  By binding its hands, the seller provides 
assurance to the buyer of its continued ability to perform.  The more valuable that 
assurance, the more the buyer would be willing to pay.  Ex post the supplier might want 





Insurance companies sell more than pure insurance.  They provide a panoply of services 
that are expected to be value enhancing, regardless of the risk attitudes of a corporation or 
its shareholders, managers, and employees.  While parties have good reasons to buy these 
                                                                                                                                                 
following levels and types of risk throughout the term of this Agreement…”  (Five-year Sales Agreement 
between E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Company and Morgan Trailer Mfg. Co., October 1, 2004) 
21 See Scott & Triantis (2006).  Even absent an adequate assurance clause, UCC §2-609 would allow the 
buyer to insist upon assurance in some circumstances. 
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services for themselves, they often condition agreements with their counterparty 
(supplier, tenant, borrower) on that party maintaining insurance coverage.  A party’s 
failure to maintain its coverage because it cannot physically or fiscally comply with the 
insurer’s conditions, lets the counterparty know that there has been an adverse change 
which might justify its terminating the agreement, and provides a verifiable bright line 
that courts would likely accept. 
 
The broader point is that when analyzing commercial dealings, risk aversion should be 
invoked only as a last resort.  The first question should be: why would the observed 
behavior be value-enhancing?  The corporate insurance decision (the purchase and the 
counterparty condition) provide a vivid example, but there are many others.  Some moral 
hazard models, for example, require risk aversion; see, for example, Milgrom & Roberts 
(1992, ch. 6-7).  If, however, the moral hazard is double-sided—that is, both parties 
influence the outcomes--risk aversion can be dispensed with.  Likewise, price adjustment 
in long-term contracts (for example, indexing) is often viewed as protection against the 
risk of fluctuations.22  It is not clear how the relative risk attitudes of the two corporations 
would apportion price fluctuation risks, especially if the firms are large, public 
corporations and the contract is a small part of each firm’s portfolio of contracts.  That 
inquiry would, I contend, be fruitless and would divert attention from the crucial 
question: how might the price adjustment mechanism add value, regardless of the specific 
tastes toward risk?23   
                                                 
22 For example, Joskow (1977, p. 173) asked: AWhy would somebody buy a long-term fixed price contract 
other than to insure against fluctuations in the price of uranium?@   
23 For some reasons for including a price adjustment mechanism in a long-term contract, see Goldberg 
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